British steel is currently losing money at a rate of £400 million per year. Some of these losses are due to the worldwide economic recession, which … will be corrected by recovery. What will not go away of its own accord is overmanning within the steel industry. Under the leadership of Sir Monty Finniston and his Chief Executive, Mr Bob Scholey, the corporation has consistently and creditably drawn attention to the need to reduce its labour force and increase its productivity. It is acutely aware that its most efficient works produce no more than 350 tons of steel per man per year against Japan's best of 750 tons. But so far its efforts to remedy the situation have been balked … what the BSC must not do-and what the Government must not let it do-is to give up its efforts to reduce its labour force to an effective level.
22 21 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol. 849, 25 January 1973, col. 697. 22 The Times, 6 January 1976.
Birth of New Labour', in G. Daniels and J. McIlroy, Trade Unions in a Neo-Liberal world: British Trade
Unions Under New Labour (Routledge, Abingdon: 2010), p. 31. 24 Ibid., A Brief History, p. 30. 25 Shortly after Harold Wilson's retirement in March 1976, James Callaghan was elected Labour Party leader, and was appointed Prime Minister. The fiscal crisis developed throughout 1976, reaching highpoints in June, when the government agreed to public spending cuts of £1 billion in return for £3.5 billion of loans from the Group of Ten central banks; September, when an application for a loan was made to the International Monetary Fund; and December, when the deal was concluded, on the basis of a further £2.5 billion in public expenditure cuts and the sale of £0. Steel plan to end steelmaking at Ebbw Vale -a decision which would eventually result in the loss of 1300 jobs. 'The BSC's case is that they can manufacture steel more cheaply elsewhere than they can here at Ebbw Vale. The facts on this are incontestable', Foot maintained. 26 In 1978, the Department of Industry produced a pessimistic, twelve-page White Paper, entitled The Road to Viability. Among its main provisions was an acceptance that steel was in permanent decline; that some markets had been lost forever; that productivity of labour was low; that there should be no more blueprints for the future of the industry; and that none of the Beswick plants had a future. 27 True, Labour governments did display concern over the social consequences of economic restructuring. For example, in the 1960s the Wilson governments had attempted to offset the rapid decline in mining employment with policies that sought to attract investment for light industries and consumer goods in the affected regions. As Phillips points out, this, the 'moral economy of deindustrialisation', was accepted by miners partly because their economic security was protected, and partly because they were involved in the decision-making process. 28 Similar objectives appeared in The Road to Viability, which highlighted the negative social impact of plant closures in a number of areas, including Ebbw Vale and Hartlepool, and pledged the maximum degree of regional assistance to create new jobs. 29 But there was little time to put these commitments to the test as the party lost power soon afterwards in the 1979 general election.
consequences. As a guiding intellectual influence in Thatcher's Conservative Party and founder of the influential neoliberal policy institute, the Centre for Policy Studies, Joseph saw economic salvation as bound up with job cuts, pay restraint, and a weakened trade-union movement. That this was the ideology now in the ascendancy within the Tory party had been seen two years earlier in the infamous 'Ridley Report.' Here, the party's Nationalised Industries Policy Group had outlined the steps by which state-owned industries could be subjected to marketization and fragmentation in order to facilitate their eventual return to the private sector.
Resistance from the unions was expected, but among the measures suggested was the provoking of a strike in a 'non-vulnerable' industry on the basis that a 'victory on ground of our choosing would discourage an attack on more vulnerable ground'.
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The fact that steel had been identified in this report as one such non-vulnerable industry did not augur well for the British Steel workforce.
Following the unions' decision to call a national strike, the promotion of the view that plant closures, redundancies and pay cuts were inevitable components of any solution dominated public discourse. Between the three-week gap that followed the announcement of the strike and its proposed starting date, steelworkers came under heavy pressure from press, British Steel management and politicians alike. An early example of was an Economist article entitled 'Bloated, Broke and Beleaguered'.
Here it was argued that the only way British Steel could improve productivity and competitiveness was to cut jobs: 'BSC's productivity is so far below its foreign competitors that it needs a big rise to hold onto its share of the world markets, i.e. the shaping of perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they cannot see or imagine an alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial.
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As applied to industrial relations generally, this 'manipulated consensus' is based on an acceptance by unions of the fundamentals of capitalism, including the primacy of market forces and concepts such as 'profitability' and 'productivity'. As applied to the steel industry, this consensus would result in British Steel's large-scale redundancy programme being effectively unchallenged.
Offe and Wiesenthal's explanation of the historic development of opportunism within the trade union movement-by which they meant the separation of economic from political struggle and the submission and assimilation of the working class movement to liberal-bourgeois political forms-is also relevant to this question. 57 In order to explain this process, they proposed a model that ISTC's insistence that it be kept informed about these plans indicated that it was the process of consultation and the smooth functioning of the collective-bargaining machinery, rather than the rationale of the decisions taken by British Steel that it considered to be of the greatest importance.
This ISTC's acceptance of capitalist prerogatives and its fundamental inability to distinguish the class interests of its members from those represented by British
Steel management found its clearest expression in the worker directors. These were union-approved employees, appointed to the divisional British Steel boards, with one representative on the national board. A concession to industrial democracy, it was designed to maintain positive industrial relations and provide a union voice in the boardroom. In practice, the worker directors often subordinated the interests of trade unions to those of the corporation management. As such, many were compliant in the corporation's policy of 'slash-and-burn'. As one reflected in 1976:
I had the bitter experience of being in a division that decided to close down two plants … I found this difficult, but not insurmountable. In our case, we were provided with all the information necessary in order to make a decision on the closures. I was party to the decisions. I was challenged by the trade unions as to my position. I told them I supported the closures simply because that was the only way I saw it, in the long term. I had an obligation to the industry.
(Emphasis added)
The inability of the steel unions' leaders to mount any defence of jobs and their deference to British Steel on matters of industrial strategy would continue throughout the strike and shape its outcome and aftermath. In the period prior to the action, Sirs went to great lengths to separate out the issues of pay and job losses, making it clear that there would be no industrial action over the latter. This was despite the TUC warning that around 200,000 related jobs could be lost because of the British Steel cuts. 61 Sirs's policy may have been pursued to allow him the possibility of agreeing a deal with the corporation on the pay claim before 2 January As a result, different regions were pitted against each other in the struggle to avoid closures. Whatever the reason, it did not bode well for the future of the 50,000 or so British Steel workers whose jobs were under threat.
The Steelworkers' Banner
The strike began on 2 January, with the ISTC and NUB claiming 100% support for the action by their members. The ISTC central office in London was the strike's national headquarters; day-to-day organization was the responsibility of the seven regional offices in Glasgow, Middlesbrough, Rotherham, Sutton Coldfield, Newport, Swansea, and Knutsford. With the strategy based around the prevention of the movement of steel, flying picketing soon became ubiquitous, co-ordinated by local committees. On 14 January, busloads of pickets from Sheffield toured the south-coast ports, 64 and pickets from Corby travelled to the east-coast ports of Boston and Kings Lynn. 65 At this stage, the strike did not officially include the private-sector plants, but many were picketed nonetheless. Four days after its start, the TGWU joined the strike, to be followed by the NUGMW and craft unions. By 9 January, all unions involved in the steel industry were on strike, with just one exception, the middle-management Steel The connection between the strike and British Steel managerial incompetence was reinforced in the third edition. Examples of mismanagement included the equipment for a second giant blastfurnace at Redcar, which had been purchased at an eye-watering cost of £110 million, and incurred interest payments of £11 million per year, but which had never been assembled and was now gathering rust in a nearby field; the construction of 'Finniston's Follies' -two direct reduction plants at Hunterston, which had been commissioned by the former corporation chairman at a cost of £65 million three years earlier, but which remained mothballed, with interest payments of £6.5 million; and the decision to cut production levels at Scunthorpe Anchor to 45,000 tonnes per week. This was especially short sighted, as the plant had not only cost £240 million to build but was capable of producing around 108,000 tonnes per week of the most cost-effective steel in Britain. For the Banner, all of these 'managerial blunders' highlighted the need for a full public inquiry into the running of the industry:
Such an inquiry will clearly show that it is not the steelworkers who are wasting millions of pounds of public money. The real culprits have forced a strike in the hope that they will evade public criticism and re-direct it onto the striking steelworkers…if there have to be cutbacks to avoid further losses What the BSC has been attempting to do is to use comparisons between some of the newest and most capital-intensive steel plants in Japan with the whole of the BSC. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that BSC's attempts to falsely portray their workers as far less productive than their foreign competitors is meant to draw attention away from those areas where the responsibility for any lack of profitability should properly be laid: BSC management. In the initial period, the strike was limited to British Steel plants. Sirs had opposed moves to include private companies and had given a commitment that they would not be picketed. 74 He argued that some were struggling financially and might close if included in the strike. However, they were important suppliers, and with the success or failure of the strike hinging on the ability of the unions to stop the movement of steel to British industry, Sirs' instructions were ignored by growing numbers of activists. By 5 January, the 20,000-strong Yorkshire -Humberside division of the union was picketing the private plants. 75 Finally, on 16 January at a joint ISTC-NUB executive meeting, it was decided to extend the strike to the private sector, with the action delayed for eleven days, at
Sirs' insistence. During this time, a number of large private firms took out an injunction against the strike, on the basis there was no trade dispute between them and the steel unions. Two days of high-level legal activity followed, which saw the injunction dismissed before being upheld on appeal by Lord Denning. A few days later, the Law Lords finally threw it out, reluctantly. 76 By the first week of February the private-sector plants were part of the official dispute but later, ISTC executive member, Tony Cook, would reflect that the legal action, and the Denning judgment in particular, 'took a lot of momentum' out of the strike.
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The Banner team had supported the decision to involve the private sector and sought to expose the weaknesses of an argument that had been repeated throughout the press, namely that as the private plants were not in dispute with the unions, they should not have been included in the strike. In a lengthy rebuttal, it was argued that the Conservatives had drawn the steelworkers into a political battle which should not be confined to the nationalized sector. In early February a series of negotiations took place to end the strike but these collapsed when the ISTC and NUB walked out of a meeting after just twenty minutes, accusing British Steel of misleading them over the details of a new offer.
They claimed that the latter had indicated an offer of 9% on the basic pay, plus a 4% guaranteed local productivity bonus, but that when the meeting started it transpired the bonus was conditional on local negotiations that would inevitably include job losses. The consequences of British Steel's mismanagement and the need for a new business strategy remained a prime concern for the Steelworkers Banner. Its work drew upon earlier reports made by the Warwick group. An example of this was the article 'Where BSC Went Wrong', which pointed out that while its European competitors invested more in finishing, the corporation tended to direct investment towards 'facilities for handling raw materials and the production of hot metal (molten Iron).' It suggested that 66% of British Steel investment during 1974-78 was allocated here, compared to an average of 23% among the six founding members of the EEC -West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg. By way of contrast, British Steel devoted just 10% to steel production, compared to 28% among the six. The corporation's investment in hot-rolled coil was also lower, but it was the finishing processes that saw the biggest difference, with British Steel's figure of 16% comparing unfavourably to the European figure of 38%. The article argued that at each stage of the steel-production process, wastage was incurred. Scrap steel could be reused, but it seemed obvious that the value of the steel increased at each stage, meaning 'the potential for increasing the yield and thereby cutting costs is much greater at the end rather than at the beginning of the steelmaking process'. It also pointed out how production based on continuous casting was lower in Britain than elsewhere. Britain had led the field in this respect in 1961, but now British Steel made just 16% of steel this way, whereas the figure for France was 24%; Germany, 31%; and Italy, 43%.
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As the strike passed the two-month mark, it was becoming clear that it had not succeeded in crippling British industry. This was partly because of pre-strike 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. In 1982, Rob Bryer, Stan Brignall and Allen Maunders published Accounting for British Steel, which was a lengthy financial analysis of BSC since 1967. Here, the trio also laid out in detail the alternative steel strategy that they had been working on since 1979. Some of the Banner suggestions for the restructuring of the industry were clearly drawn from the work of this group.
stockpiling but also because it had proved impossible to picket every works, business or stockholder connected to the industry. The action remained solid in the British Steel plants but it was a different story in the private sector. Workers in the private plants had been willing to strike in support of their British Steel colleagues, but in the absence of any real direction by the union leaders, and a growing sense that British industry was coping with the strike, their action began to crumble. At its height, the strike in the private sector had involved forty-three of the forty-four plants, with the sole exception being Sheerness. The situation had begun to change towards the end of February. On 24 February, workers at Hadfield in Sheffield voted to return to work. Mass meetings had also taken place at the East Hecla and Leeds Road plants in
Sheffield, where ISTC members had been warned of the possibility of significant job losses in the event of a lengthy strike. 88 On 29 February, the ISTC executive met to discuss the strike in the private sector; delegates from over twenty private companies reported that in some plants there had been a general return to work, but that union officials had remained on strike and as a consequence were 'left in a very exposed position'. Sirs applied further pressure by pointing out how the annual agreement with the Independent Steel Employers Association was due to expire soon, and that problems in the negotiations with the Midlands Wages Board could not be resolved until the strike ended. 89 After a lengthy discussion, the ISTC executive instructed its branch officials to return to work at those plants where the workforce had drifted back.
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The negative impact of this directive was seen at the Darlington and Simpson plant. In mid-February, just seven of the ISTC's 730 members at the plant had voted against the strike; 91 by 3 March, this had been reversed with a 'huge majority' now voting for a return to work. 92 The ISTC representative at the branch, Morris
Hutchinson, stated that it had been the union directive that had been responsible for 88 North East Echo, 25 February 1980. 89 After the end of the strike, the Midland Wages Board agreements were suspended altogether by the employers, and were replaced with individual agreements between unions and companies. Many union representatives were also sacked. this, as it gave members in the private works the option of returning to work without being accused of strikebreaking. 93 At this stage, the ISTC estimated that around 9000 of its 20,000 members in the private sector had returned to work. 94 A significant section of the membership continued to support the strike, but this was weakening.
The Banner attempted to shore up morale. The paper claimed to have been given a document which revealed that the CBI, the British Iron and Steel Producers Association (BISPA) and British Steel management, agreed at a meeting on 22
January that the CBI would 'leak' news to the press that steel users still had good supplies of stocks. The Banner presented this as part of a deliberate conspiracy designed to make it appear as though the strike was having little impact. in order to end the strike, the reality of the relationship between it and the Banner team became more evident. Edition ten of the newspaper showed this clearly.
Published in early March, the front page article was, for the first time, written by Sirs himself. Although presented as 'a reasonable compromise to end the deadlock', the article indicated that the ISTC was preparing to accept British Steel's prescription for restructuring the industry. Among the concessions offered was union acceptance of the principle of locally negoitiated productivity deals; an understanding that these should be 'self-financing' so as to fund a significant portion of the national award;
and a commitment that 'international manning levels' -which meant job cutsshould be provided within the next twelve months. Sirs spelt it out: 'it will not be easy for us. It will require revolutionary changes in traditional beliefs and practices. It 
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After the strike's end, the ISTC research team continued to argue that the industry was viable and had a future. Later in 1980, it published New Deal for Steel, a book that followed the lines of argument set out in the Banner. British Steel was challenged on a number of fronts, including its arguments that there had been a slump in demand; that the British steel industry was suffering from overcapacity;
and that lower prices around the world were responsible for British Steel losing twothirds of its export market. New Deal pointed out that no other country in the EEC had cut its output by as much as British Steel and contended, presciently as it has transpired, that world steel consumption would rise throughout the 1980s as a whole. Quoting the OECD, it argued that although developing countries would be producing steel, there would still be a global shortfall of almost 100 million tonnes.
A new strategy was advanced, which included greater subsidies for coking coal, rail freight, investment capital, and training costs; an aggressive commercial strategy, conducted by better sales strategies and staff; greater diversification into continuous-casting production; and more investment in the finishing end. Here, New
Deal pointed out that whereas basic hot-metal production was worth £90 per tonne, 98 SB14.
galavanized steel sold for £260 per tonne and tin plate for £451. 99 It was a 'recurring complaint' that British Steel was too large and inflexible. For example, it could expand electric-arc production, which would provide the 'greatest flexibility'. 100 In his preface to New Deal Sirs outlined a future 'in which customers can have cheaper steel, taxpayers can be saved money, BSC can prosper and steelworkers' jobs can be safeguarded'. But British Steel was never likely to take the New Deal strategy seriously. Neither did an ISTC leadership that had already abandoned tens of thousands of jobs make much of an argument that it should do so. Instead, the corporation, now headed by Ian MacGregor, 101 embarked upon a sudden acceleration of the programme of plant closures and redundancies. Already 'politically weak' after the strike, the steel unions were further 'excluded from the policy making process', and watched on from the sidelines as the industry was restructured from regional divisions into self-contained product-based 'profit centres', pending its eventual privatization. 102 In his retirement, Sirs would take satisfaction that during MacGregor's three-year tenure, British Steel would never actually make a profit, 103 something of a cold comfort for the 90,000 steelworkers who would lose their jobs during his attempt to do so.
Conclusion: the neoliberal moment
In his essay on trade-unionism and politics, McIlroy identified the late 1970s as 'the moment of neo-liberalism'; the point at which the prolonged crisis of planning, the faltering corporatist experiment, the periodic challenges to the state, the pressure on profits, the resilience, unpredictability and economic consequences of fragmented collective bargaining, recurring stagflation…in the context of Britain's decline in a changing world economy, made strong trade unionism appear a liability'. 104 It was a moment long in preparation. Right-wing policy institutes had been producing such propaganda for many years, 105 helping to shape the parameters of political discourse. Hyman has shown how, prior to the 1979 election, Conservatives focused on 'trade union power' as the most important political issue, and blamed 'a minority of extremists' for causing Britain's economic decline. Party. 107 But at the same time, the ISTC remained a workers' organization and had to defend the interests of its members. As such, it could not accept indefinitely savage cuts and low pay. It might have done so for a while under a Labour government, but in the face of this attack by the Conservatives, the pressure from below to respond eventually outweighed and overwhelmed the cautious politics of the leaders. The result was a strike that would prove far more resilient than the authors of the Ridley Report had ever thought possible.
McIlroy also argued that even during this period of 'high tide', trade unions in Britain wielded only a restricted, fragmented, and largely negative power over the market 'which they were unable to co-ordinate and develop into positive power over the state'. 108 This was apparent in the steelworkers' strike. Although steelworkers received varying degrees of support from other sections of the trade-union movement, including some of the lorry drivers and dockers within the TGWU, it was a strike they largely fought on their own and one that failed to cripple British industry. Neither did the ambitions of the union leaders move beyond the pay claim.
The ISTC was careful not to present the strike as a challenge to British Steel and the Thatcher government's steel strategy. Notwithstanding the fact that their organizations now faced an existential crisis, leaders of the steel unions refused to popularize an alternative that might challenge the pro-rationalization hegemony. 109 Sirs had stated previously that the main reason for this was union unwillingness to be held responsible for the job losses he felt would inevitably result from any new strategy for the industry. 110 Jukes has written of a third dimension of power, that of an ideological hegemony so strong that alternatives to it are unimaginable. Muller Jenstch has theorised the concept of the tame and unchallenging 'co-operative trade union, which positions its bargaining role within the requirements of capitalism. The negativity and the policies of the ISTC at this critical juncture in its history gives credence to both those theories. Certainly, the leadership of the union adopted a pessimistic perspective, one that displayed the extent to which it had accepted capitalist ideology and one that would leave steelworkers defenceless in throughout the 1970s. Arguments aired in the Banner were later published as the New Deal for Steel. Some of its prescriptions proved to be valuable. Two in particular stand out: first, the suggestion that more investment be weighted towards the finishing-end of production; and, second, a greater use of continuous casting.
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Whereas concast was responsible for just 17% of production in 1979, by 1990 this had risen to 90%. 112 There was also greater investment in value-added products, such as hot-rolled coil, which rose from 9% of the market in 1974 to 15% by 1988.
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The unwillingness of union leaders to support this strategy was unsurprising.
It was only because of the space created by the extraordinary and temporary circumstances of a national strike that the Banner's arguments had been allowed such free reign. Steel-union leaders had accepted the rationalization process for many years before the strike, and it was always likely that they would do so again after the return to work. This was especially so, given the new, harsher context in which they then found themselves. The remit of incoming British Steel chair,
MacGregor, was to return the company to profitability as soon as possible. To this end, he immediately cut tens of thousands of jobs. Supported by a Conservative government that was willing to accept mass unemployment in pursuit of its social and economic policies, conditions could hardly have been more favourable for him or more difficult for the steel unions.
Union challenges to the managerial prerogative are rare. Capitalism operates on the basis that managers have full access to company financial data and use this to construct business strategy. Any suggestion that organized labour be part of this process is regarded as a breach in the demarcated roles of managers and workers, and a subversion of the former's authority. Free Enterprise Campaign, against the demand. Included among the propaganda was a sustained reworking of the concept of profit, in order that the American public be 'educated' away from the dangerous temptation to view these as sums of money created through unpaid labour, undeservedly pocketed by wealthy shareholders.
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However, if such challenges were always uncommon, then Britain in the 1980s was a place where they were likely to be even rarer still. As the political economy was moved further away from collectivism, it was the concepts and practices of industrial democracy that were increasingly targeted and ultimately households, which concluded that the increase in inequality witnessed during the 1980s dwarfed any fluctuations seen in previous decades. The incomes of the richest 10% of the population rose twice as fast as those of the poorest 10%. However, when housing costs were taken into consideration, it was estimated that the real incomes of this poorest 10% actually fell during the 1980s -from £71 per week to £63 (£110 to £92, using 1991 figures). New Labour governments under both Tony Blair and Gordon Brown as prime minister spent far more on the welfare state, but as with the Conservatives, believed in the rule of global market forces and the doctrines of economic liberalism. During their thirteen years in power, the social inequality that characterized Thatcher's Britain was never reversed. For more, see P. Addison, No Turning Back, pp. 329, 408-409.
